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NEGLIGENCE - INTERSPOUSAL TORT IMMUNITY -ACTION BY WIFE AGAINST 
DECEASED HUSBAND'S ESTATE - When the automobile driven by plaintiff's 
husband collided with another vehicle, plaintiff's husband was killed and 
she was seriously injured and rendered mentally incompetent. Plaintiff's 
guardian brought a negligence action for her injuries against the other 
driver, who im.pleaded the administrator of her husband's estate as a third-
party defendant. The trial court denied administrator's pre-trial motion 
for summary judgment,1 and subsequently entered judgment against the 
administrator. On certification, held, affirmed. The doctrine of tort im-
munity between spouses is based on a policy of preserving domestic peace 
and harmony and preventing fraudulent collusion against insurance com-
panies, and does not apply where death dissolves the marital relationship 
and eliminates the opportunity for collusion. Long v. Landy, 171 A.2d 1 
(N.J. 1961). 
At common law neither husband nor wife could sue the other for 
tortious conduct.2 The historical basis for the doctrine lies in a combination 
of substantive and procedural reasonss rooted in the concept of the legal 
unity of husband and wife.4 Although this concept is now generally 
recognized as a fiction,11 justification for the doctrine is usually found in 
the public policy against disrupting domestic harmony by litigation 
between man and wife.6 The most significant departure from the doctrine 
of interspousal tort immunity came with the passage of the Married 
Women's Acts, which were enacted primarily to create or recognize a 
1Long v. Landy, 60 N.J. Super. 362, 158 A.2d 728 (1960). 
2 Phillips v. Barnet, I Q.B.D. 436 (1876); see PROSSER, Toa'IS § 101 (2d ed. 1955). 
8 See PROSSER, note 2 supra, and McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic 
Relation, 48 HARV, L. REv. 1031 (1930). 
4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES •442, •448; 2 id. •483; See generally Williams, The 
Legal Unity of Husband and Wife, IO Mon. L. REv. 16 (1947). 
II See influential dissent of Pound, J., in Allen v. Allen, 246 N.Y. 571, 159 N.E. 656 
(1927). 
o Although the domestic tranquility argument is decisive in most courts today, it 
does not seem as compelling as it apparently was in 1858 when the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court stated, "The flames which litigation would kindle on the domestic hearth would 
consume in an instant the conjugal bond, and bring on a new era indeed-an era of 
universal discord, of unchastity, of bastardy, of dissoluteness, of violence, cruelty, and 
murders." Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa. 396, 398 (1858). 
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substantive right in the wife to her separate property interests; many 
of these statutes permitted a wife to sue in her own behalf to protect 
these interests. Most courts today agree that the acts which allowed her 
the right to sue served to negate both the legal unity concept and the 
domestic harmony policy, at least in regard to property tort actions.7 
Furthermore, many of these acts were written in broad language which 
appeared to authorize a wife to bring any legal action which could be 
brought by a single woman.8 Although such statutes might have been 
construed to allow a wife's personal injury action against her husband, the 
prevailing view has been that these acts were not intended to give a wife a 
right which even her husband did not have at common law.o Thus in 
almost two-thirds of our states today one spouse still may not sue the 
other for a personal tort.10 A growing minority of jurisdictions have be-
come dissatisfied with the logic and results of the doctrine and reject it 
entirely.11 Where the majority rule prevails, however, an action for a 
personal tort committed during marriage is prohibited even after the 
marriage relationhip has been disrupted by separation,12 desertion,13 
divorce,1 4 or annulment.15 Even in the case of the death of one spouse, 
the courts which subscribe to the interspousal immunity doctrine generally 
deny a spouse's personal tort action against the estate of the deceased 
7 For an analysis of the provisions of state statutes, see McCurdy, Personal Injury 
Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REv. 303, 310-13 (1959). See further 3 VERNIER, 
AMERICAN FAMILY LAws § 180 (1935). 
8 E.g., "Married women shall have power .•• to sue separately ••. for torts com-
mitted against them, as fully and freely as if they were unmarried .•.. " D. C. CODE ANN. 
§ 30-208 (1951). 
9The leading case is Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910), interpreting the 
forerunner of the District of Columbia statute quoted supra note 7. For a collection of 
cases for other jurisdictions, see McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 
43 HARv. L. REv. 1031 (1930); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 632 (1955). 
10 PROSSER, TORTS § 101 (2d ed. 1955). 
11 Most of the jurisdictions that reject the doctrine have done so by a liberal inter-
pretation of the Married Women's Acts. These courts find no basis for distinguishing 
property tort from personal tort actions on the basis of the legal unity doctrine or the 
policy of preserving domestic harmony. E.g., Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953). 
A few jurisdictions have rejected the doctrine via express statute: N.Y. DoM. REL. I.Aw § 
57; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (Supp. 1959); Wrs. STAT. § 246.07-.075 (1957). Contra, ILL. 
ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1959); see N.Y. INs. LAw § 167 (3) which exempts the 
insurer from indemnifying the insured spouse for a tort committed on the other spouse 
unless a provision expressly covering this liability is inserted into the policy. 
12 Carmichael v. Carmichael, 53 Ga. App. 663, 187 S.E. 116 (1936); Holman v. Holman, 
73 Ga. App. 205, 35 S.E.2d 923 (1945). 
13 Clark v. Clark, 11 F.2d 871 (S.D. N.Y. 1925) (semble), a[J'd per curiam, 11 F.2d 871 
(2d Cir. 1926). 
14 Wallach v. Wallach, 94 Ga. App. 576, 95 S.E.2d 750 (1956); Abbott v. Abbott, 67 
Me. 304 (1877); Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898); Strom v. Strom, 
98 Minn. 427, 107 N.W. 1047 (1906); Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281 (1886); Schultz 
v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118 Pac. 629 (1911). Contra, Gremillion v. Caffey, 71 So. 2d 
670 (La. App. 1954) (semble). 
15 Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N.E.2d 637 (1948); Lunt v. Lunt, 121 S.W.2d 
445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). Contra, Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 44 N.E. 462 (1896); 
cf. Watson v. Watson, 39 Cal. 2d 305, 246 P.2d 19 (1952). 
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spouse.10 The jurisdiction of the principal case is committed to the majority 
rule and would deny the action if the husband were still living.17 If the 
rule rests solely on the policy of preserving domestic tranquility, the result 
in the principal case follows logically from the given facts. However, 
other considerations may be found to support the doctrine and provide 
a basis for continuing the immunity, at least in modified form, even after 
the death of one spouse. 
One consideration is the danger that the surviving spouse will press 
false claims upon the deceased spouse's estate. If the decedent's estate is 
to be liable for torts arising out of the marriage, the surviving spouse might 
well be tempted by liability insurance1S or estate assetst9 to file suit for 
all manner of hurts and annoyances20 suffered during marriage. The 
possibility that many claims would be invalid or fraudulent is enhanced by 
the prevailing rule that the statute of limitations does not run between 
husband and wife during coverture,21 thus presenting the problem of fraud 
associated with stale claims.22 Furthermore, although the surviving spouse, 
like any other plaintiff, has the burden of proof, the temptation to offer 
perjured testimony is greatest when the claim is difficult to disprove.2s 
16 In re Estate of Dolmage, 203 Iowa 231, 212 N.W. 553 (1927); Wilson v. Brown, 154 
S.W. 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Keister's Adm'r v. Keister•s Ex'rs, 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 
(1918); Wright v. Davis, 132 W. Va. 722, 53 S.E.2d 335 (1949). Contra, Johnson v. Peoples 
First Nat'! Bank &: Trust Co., 394 Pa. 116, 145 A.2d 716 (1958); Brower v. Webb, 5 D. & 
C.2d 193 (C.P. Phila. 1955); Bodnar v. Herley, 47 Berks. 31 (C.P. Pa. 1954); cf. Apitz v. 
Dames, 205 Ore. 242, 287 P .2d 585 (1955) (intentional tort); Ennis v. Truhitte, 306 
S.W.2d 549 (Mo. 1957) (willful and wanton negligence): Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 
S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960) (child against parent); Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 
Atl. 663 (1936) (wrongful death action by parent of wife against deceased husband's 
estate). 
17 Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958). 
18 "[A] raid upon an insurance company" would be the only reason a wife would 
want to sue her husband for a negligent tort. Newton v. Weber, 119 Misc. 240, 241, 196 
N.Y.S. 113, 114 (Sup. Ct. 1922); see Boisvert v. Boisvert, 94 N.H. 357, 53 A.2d 515 (1947); 
Fuchs v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co. of America, 171 Misc. 908, 14 N.Y.S.2d 387 
(Sup. Ct. 1939), afj'd, 258 App. Div. 603, 17 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1940); Villaret v. Villaret, 169 
F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948). However, "automobile liability policies often exclude from 
coverage ••• liability to members of the household •••• " VANCE, INSURANCE § 196 (3d ed. 
1951). 
19 Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 308 (1877); cf. Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 
N.W. 33 (1940). 
20 See Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N.W. 624 (1920) (injunction against nagging 
denied); Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926) (dissent) (discussing the prob• 
lem of an excessively kissed wife). 
21 E.g., Morris v. Pennsgrove Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 115 N.J. Eq. 219, 170 Atl. 16 
(1934). 
22 "They [statutes of limitations] were enacted to prevent frauds; to prevent parties 
from asserting rights after the lapse of time had destroyed or impaired the evidence which 
would show that such rights never existed •••• " Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 
349 (1874). 
23 See In the Matter of the Estate of Crawford, 155 Kan. 388, 392, 125 P.2d 354, 357 
(1942): "What about the jeopardy to the interests of other heirs .•. if a widow were 
permitted to set up old claims against her husband, supported only by her own averments 
and which the other heirs would frequently have no means of disproving?" 
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Although the dead man statutes would probably preclude the injured 
spouse from testifying herself,24 a person who would be willing to commit 
perjury in the first place would also be tempted to suborn a third person 
to swear falsely.25 Nevertheless, "there is opportunity for fraud and collu-
sion in many legal proceedings, but our system of courts and juries is 
very well designed to seek them out and its presence clearly furnishes no 
just or moral basis for precluding honest and meritorious actions."26 
A more fundamental reason for denying liability for torts which occur 
in the ordinary course of marital activity is presented by the special nature 
of interspousal conduct. Since such conduct rests on a basis entirely 
different from that of the typical tort situation, conduct which might be 
tortious between persons not husband and wife should be distinguished 
from similar conduct between spouses.27 At least two differentiating 
characteristics are ascertainable: the attitudes of precaution existing between 
husband and wife, and the sharing of risk among members of a family 
unit. Although marriage is generally thought to increase the responsibilities 
between a man and woman, the familiarity which develops between husband 
and wife might result in a less cautious attitude toward each other than 
would be taken toward a stranger. For example, a person may expose his 
spouse to the same hazards he takes himself, regardless of whether this 
is more or less caution than would be taken if third parties were involved. 
Rather than indicating a lack of respect for the safety of one's spouse, this 
attitude can be said to flow from the close identity of personalities and 
interests implicit in the marital relationship. Closely related to this 
unique concept of care between spouses is the element of risk-sharing in 
the conduct of the marital enterprise.28 Since the affairs of the modem 
family are typically conducted on a joint basis, the wife is no longer 
restricted to the role of a junior partner. The common interests of 
husband and wife should require that each bear the ordinary risks as 
well as the benefits of activities undertaken for marital purposes. These 
two distinguishing characteristics of interspousal conduct provide a basis 
for limiting the application of the interspousal tort immunity doctrine to 
situations in which the negligence does not consist of an extreme departure 
from ordinary standards of care, and the activity arises out of and in the 
24 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 578 (3d ed. 1940). 
25 McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 65 (1954). 
26 Koplik. v. C. P. Trucking Co., 27 N.J. 1, 15, 141 A.2d 34, 42 (1958) (dissent); see 
Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Ky. 1953); Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 
403, 87 P.2d 660, 668 (1938). 
27 See McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REv. 303, 338 
(1959). But see Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 314, 287 P.2d 572, 584 (1955): "We are not 
disposed to carve out the area within which actions for negligence should be allowed, or 
that other area in which the intimacy of the family relationship forbids recovery by the 
spouses." 
28 See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1031, 
1055 (1930); Sanford, Personal Torts Within the Family, 9 VAND. L. REv. 823 (1956); 
Comment, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 610 (1956). 
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course of the marital relation. Thus, if a wife negligently prepares the 
family dinner so that her husband becomes seriously ill, or if a husband 
injures his wife by negligently driving his automobile in his haste to get his 
wife to the grocery store before closing hours, there should be no liability 
even if the tortfeasor spouse has died. Although each of the suggested 
qualifications to the immunity doctrine presents difficulties in application, 
the courts have considerable experience with similar problems in other 
contexts. For example, in delimiting what activity arises out of and in 
the course of the marital relationship, the courts can look to their ex-
perience with an analogous provision in the workmen's compensation 
statutes20 or the "family purpose" doctrine of vicarious liability for auto-
mobile accidents.a0 Similarly, to determine what conduct constitutes an 
extreme departure from ordinary care31 the courts could develop concepts 
similar to those employed to interpret automobile guest statutes which 
limit liability to guest passengers for gross negligence, or willful, wanton 
and reckless conduct.32 In spite of the difficulties which would be en-
countered in applying these standards, a doctrine of qualified interspousal 
tort immunity presents a reasonable alternative to the complete acceptance 
or rejection of the common law doctrine. 
Charles E. Voltz 
20 1 LARSON, WoRitMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 6.00-29.20 (1952). 
30 See generally Lattin, Vicarious Liability and the Family Automobile, 26 MICH. L. 
REv. 846 (1928). 
31 See classic definition of gross negligence by Rugg, C.J., in Altman v. Aronson, 231 
Mass. 588, 121 N.E. 505 (1919). 
32 See generally Weber, Guest Statutes, 11 U. Cmc. L. REv. 24 (1937). 
